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resumo 
 
 
Este trabalho mostra evidência empírica sobre a existência de risco moral na 
prescrição de medicamentos em Portugal. A questão é abordada numa 
situação onde os copagamentos de alguns pacientes são muito baixos. Assim, 
o principal objetivo é testar se os pacientes, que são abrangidos pelo escalão 
de comparticipação superior, consomem menos genéricos prescritos por 
médicos do que os pacientes com maior copagamento. 
O modelo econométrico estimado pelo Método dos Mínimos Quadrados; 
métodos dos Efeitos Fixos e Efeitos Aleatórios e pelo método “Equação de 
Estimação Generalizada” a partir de um painel de vendas dos medicamentos 
de Sistema Nacional de Saúde e os dados de despesas de Sistema Nacional 
de Saúde por mês para o período de 2004 a 2009. Os dados abrangem 38 
subgrupos farmacêuticos.  
Os resultados mostram que quando o nível de comparticipação aumenta (ou a 
parte do custo que Sistema Nacional de Saúde paga) o rácio do consumo 
entre medicamentos genéricos e de marca diminui. É encontrada assim 
evidência empírica da existência de risco moral na prescrição médica. No 
entanto, quando é considerada a diferença de preço entre medicamentos de 
marca e genéricos a existência de risco moral é parcial.  
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abstract 
 
This work provides evidence on the existence of moral hazard in the 
prescription of drugs in Portugal. The question is addressed in a setting where 
co-payments of some patients are very low. So the main aim is to test if 
patients, who covered by higher reimbursement level, consume fewer generics 
prescribed by physicians than patients with higher co-payment.  
The econometric model is estimated with Pooled Ordinary Least Square 
Estimation, Fixed and Random Effects, and with Generalized Estimating 
Equations approach for a panel of monthly National Health System drug sales 
and reimbursement expenditure data from 2004 to 2009. We use dataset, 
which covers 38 pharmaceutical subgroups.  
The main results show that the greater the reimbursement level that the patient 
has (or the part of cost that National Health System pays), the lower the 
proportion of generics prescriptions made by physicians. This confirms the 
existence of moral hazard. However, when the price difference between 
branded drugs and generics is considered, only partial existence of moral 
hazard is found.  
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“When it comes to health care, higher costs don’t always mean better care.” 
  Salynn Boyles 
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1. Introduction  
Pharmaceutical expenditure is one of the biggest spending components in 
medical care expenditure, both public and private. It represents nearly one fifth 
(19%) of all health expenditure on average in OECD countries and it accounted for 
more than 700USD billion in 2009. The increase in spending on pharmaceuticals 
has contributed to the growth of total health expenditure in the last 20 years. In 
Portugal, between 2000 and 2009, pharmaceutical spending increased on average 
1.9% per year in real terms. Pharmaceutical spending represented 2.1% of the 
Portuguese GDP, in 2009. This is 40% above the OECD average (OECD, 2011). 
The rising drug expenditure has been driven by two main factors: the 
demographic changes (such as the elderly population and the number of 
individuals with chronic diseases) and the introduction of new high cost drugs. In 
response to increased expenditure, all countries have introduced different 
strategies to contain this cost (Mossialos & Barros, 1998).  One of these strategies 
is the promotion of generics competition. In this promotional effort, physicians1 and 
patients play an important role. Physician’s role is to prescribe drugs for the 
patients. In some cases patients can influence the physician’s choice between two 
versions of the same drug. The government regulates the prescription procedure. 
However, it is difficult to control the decision of doctors about prescription, since 
they can justify it with patient needs. Empirical evidence suggests that physicians 
and patients prefer branded drugs over generics version. Since generic drugs may 
present uncertainty about side effects and some therapeutic effects and there are 
no economic incentives to choose cheaper generics, etc. For instance, high 
reimbursement level prevents patient from an extra cost, associated with 
acquisition of branded drugs (Lundin, 2000).  
The Portuguese National Health System (NHS) includes a drug 
reimbursement system that covers the whole population. The cost of drugs is 
usually shared between the NHS and the patient. The price a patient pays for a 
prescribed drug, called the co-payment, depends on the patient’s disease and the 
                                                          
1
 The pharmacist may substitute branded drugs for generics if the doctor has previously allowed it. However it 
is difficult to control if the pharmacist substituted the prescribed drug in our statistical data.    
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patient’s social-economic situation. There are four main reimbursement categories 
in Portugal, which vary from 15% to 90%.  In some circumstances, the total drug 
cost (100%) may be paid by the NHS.  
One may wonder if patients who are covered by higher reimbursement rate 
consume fewer generic drugs. This phenomenon is called moral hazard. It means 
the high usage of more expensive branded drugs when the patient’s marginal 
costs are low due to insurance (high reimbursement level). Moral hazard is a 
phenomenon in the pharmaceutical market and it has been subject to several 
research work both theoretical and empirical (Pauly, 1968; Coscelli, 1998). 
However, the empirical evidence on moral hazard in pharmaceutical market is not 
conclusive. Some authors find evidence supporting its existence (Lundin, 2000; 
Rudholm, 2005); others do not (Hellerstein, 1998). 
The main aim of this work is to test the existence of moral hazard in the 
prescription of drugs in Portugal, that is, to verify if higher reimbursement level 
motivates doctors to prescribe branded drugs instead of generics.  
Our data comprises NHS drugs sales and NHS reimbursement expenditure 
per month for 38 pharmaceutical subgroups, for which generics exist in the period 
2004 to 2009. We use pooled ordinary least squares estimation (OLS), fixed 
effects approach (FE), random effects approach (RE) and generalized estimating 
equations (GEE) population-average approach to estimate demand model. For 
each specification, we test the differences in the coefficients for FE and RE, using 
a Sargan-Hansen test. We also use the GEE approach and compare results with 
the RE approach.  
The obtained results make it possible to estimate the determinants for the 
demand of generic drugs. We determine two approaches for testing the existence 
of moral hazard. The first approach uses reimbursement level and the second one 
uses the relative expenditure between NHS and patients.  
The analysis is done for the set of all pharmaceutical subgroups in the three 
levels of reimbursement and also for a subset of drugs subgroups in the two lower 
levels of reimbursement. 
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The main results confirm the existence of moral hazard in physicians’ 
prescription behavior in the Portuguese pharmaceutical market. However, this 
effect seems to be stronger in the highest reimbursement category.  
This work is organized as follows. The next section is the literature review. In 
section 3 we describe the hypothesis, estimation method and econometric model. 
Next we present our data and a descriptive analysis. The results are presented 
and discussed on section 4. The conclusion and discussion are included in section 
5. The references are in the last section. Tables and figures are reported in the 
appendices. 
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2. Literature review 
2.1 Moral Hazard in pharmaceutical industry 
Moral hazard in health care industry is an important problem, which many 
researchers have studied. Moral hazard in health care was first described by Pauly 
(1968). Under the presence of uncertainty, people buy insurance. Health 
insurance leads patients to over consume medical care, not because of “moral 
perfidy, but of rational economic behavior”.  
Traditional health care plans cover drug prescriptions, hospital stays, 
physiotherapy, alternative therapy, visits to doctor, diagnostic tests, etc. We will 
focus on the first one, that is, on medical prescriptions.  
Medical insurance can be provided by insurance companies and/or by a 
third-party payer. In countries with a National Health Service, such as Italy, 
Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom, the government implicitly acts as the 
insurer. A common feature regarding the moral hazard is the price of health care, 
which is very low or even zero (Zweifel, Breyer & Kifmann, 2009). 
Consumption and dispensing of drugs is a complex procedure, in which 
doctors, the third-party payer (national insurer) and the patients play a role. The 
physicians are agents both for the patient and for the insurance companies or the 
national insurer. It may create a “double agency” problem (Blomqvist, 1991). They 
have to achieve efficiency in performing the tasks for both the patient and the 
insurance provider. It is impossible to motivate doctors to fulfill their double agency 
role. Different contract systems influence them to act more in the interest of the 
patient, while others induce them to act more in the interest of the insurer.  
In many countries of Europe the government regulates the prescription 
procedure. However, it is difficult to control the decision of doctors about 
prescription and it may be convenient for them to please their patients on 
prescribing more expensive drugs, certifying the necessity for the prescribed 
treatment (Arrow, 1963). 
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2.1.1 Brand name loyalty and agents’ preference   
Pharmaceutical expenditure is large and increasing in most OECD 
countries. There are different strategies to reduce this expenditure, for instances 
the implementation of Generic Substitution Policies. Empirical evidence suggests 
that these policies have an influence on the increase of generics market share. 
However, in many countries, branded drugs hold a bigger market share than 
generics. From the literature we can find different explanations to this fact.  
Patients may have preferences for using a branded drug since they were 
using it for long time, during patent protection. For some patients it may be difficult 
to accept that a drug with a different name, color and shape can have exactly the 
same therapeutic qualities (Coscelli, 1998). The doctor as agent may be 
influenced by the choice of patients (Dalen, Furu, Locatelli & Strom, 2011).  
The physicians may prefer the branded drug because of their experience 
with the product over the period of exclusivity or because there are no incentives 
to change prescription habits (an example: price of new drugs higher than the 
reference price) (López-Casanovas & Puig-Junoy, 2000). 
In some cases doctors’ prescription decision can be influenced by 
incentives from pharmaceutical companies. There are different forms of incentives: 
checks (Harris, 2004), food, samples, gifts, trips (Burtka, 2007). These incentives 
are called detailing.   
The role of the physician in the choice between generics and branded drugs 
was examined by Hellerstein (1998). The author found that physicians are 
important agents in determining whether patients acquire branded drugs or 
generics. The author didn't find evidence that patients who are not covered by 
insurance for prescribed drugs are more likely to get generics. However, Lundin 
(2000) and Coscelli (1998) remarked that Hellerstein’s data set had some 
limitations. It did not contain relative prices and so one cannot account for the 
effect of price difference between versions on consumption. Moreover, the 
information recorded by physicians is related to a two-week period only, so when a 
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specific patient visited the doctor only once, his preference and habits for a certain 
version cannot be accounted for. 
The importance of doctors’ and patients’ preferences in the prescription 
decision was analyzed by Coscelli (1998). The author’s detailed dataset contains 
all the prescriptions in the anti-ulcer drug market during the period 1990-1992. The 
author found that habits and preferences are very important for both; doctors and 
patients. The patient may have preferences for consuming branded drugs and 
may influence the physicians’ choice. Doctors’ prescribing behavior shows habit 
persistence. As prices are always the same for different drug versions of the same 
active ingredient, according to Drug Regulatory System in Italy, there are no 
economic incentives for either physicians or patients to prefer one version over the 
other2.  
Coscelli (1998) and Hellerstein’s (1998) results are consistent with Caves, 
Whinston & Hurwitz (1991), who conclude that advantage achieved by branded 
drugs relatively to later generic entrants is partly due to doctors’ habits in using 
branded drugs. 
Thus, on the one hand, lower consumption of generics can be explained by 
the habit of agents. On the other hand, it can be due to the poor information about 
cheaper generic drugs. This prevents physicians from prescribing generics, 
thereby contributing to the dispensation of the branded drugs. Patients, in turn, 
may trust in their physician and accept what is prescribed. 
Some physicians know about price differences. Still, they do not act upon 
this information. This suggests that they might have other reasons besides the 
habit for certain version of drug and the lack of information about available 
alternatives for not always prescribing the cheapest version. On the one hand, it 
may be associated with the agents’ uncertainty in what regards the therapeutic 
effect of generics - they simply do not know that versions are alike. On the other 
hand, it also matters who pays the costs. If the government acts as the insurer and 
reimburse greater part of drugs cost, agents do not have to worry about an extra 
                                                          
2
 During Coscelli’s (1998) research, direct advertising to patient for prescription of drugs was not possible. 
Moreover the pharmacist did not have the right to substitute branded drugs for generics. 
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cost associated with buying expensive branded drugs. Thus, patients and 
physicians do not have any real reason to prefer lower-priced generics or do not 
have incentives to change their habits of using branded drugs (Lundin, 2000). If 
doctors take into account the patients’ interests more than the third-party payer, 
then the expenditure of third-party payer is not important for them.  
In the absence of incentives to keep costs down, prescribing decisions may 
depend on the experience with branded drug and its reputation; on the absence of 
confidence to new generics, and on the patients’ preferences. Thus, we can 
expect that amount of generics consumed will decrease with the amount that the 
government pays. 
 Therefore, one may wonder if high reimbursement level (and/or low 
patients’ co-payment) can negatively affect the penetration of generics into the 
market. 
 
2.1.2 Empirical evidence on the existence of moral hazard in 
consumption of pharmaceuticals 
There are some works on the analysis about the effect of insurance co-
payment on the pharmaceutical market. It is worth mentioning the study by 
Leibowitz, Manning & Newhouse (1985). This research is based on data from the 
Rand Health Insurance Experiment. Results show that a higher rate of 
reimbursement causes a higher drug acquisition. There is 57% increase in per 
capita expenditure in the absence of co-payment in respect to the situation in 
which the coinsurance rate is 95%. 
More recently Coulson, Terza, Neslusan & Stuart (1995) found that patients 
with medical insurance use more prescribed drugs than those with no insurance. 
Similar results were obtained in the working paper by Coulson & Stuart (1995). 
Authors concluded that elder patients use less prescription than people, who are 
covered by employer-sponsored plan. 
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In the Swedish pharmaceutical market Lundin (2000) examines whether the 
choice made by physicians to prescribe generics or branded drugs is subject to 
moral hazard. The author uses a data set with information on exactly what drug 
was prescribed at a particular patient visit to the physician. The results show that 
physicians’ habits as well as patients’ preferences are important. Patients who 
have to pay more are less likely to have branded drug than patients who pay a 
small co-payment. This indicates the existence of moral hazard in the Swedish 
pharmaceutical market. 
Rudholm (2005) tested the impact of pharmaceutical insurance on the 
demand for prescribed pharmaceuticals in Sweden. The data covered all 
pharmaceutical prescriptions sold in the county of Vasterbotten, Sweden, during 
2001. It includes information about patient’s gender and age, the number of 
Defined Daily Doses (DDD)3, total cost, and the patients’ co-payment for the 
prescription. The main result shows that DDD and price of drugs increase, when 
pharmaceutical insurer pays part of the cost. There is a large effect between the 
10% co-payment level and the 0% level. The author suggests that on introducing a 
small patient co-payment for all prescriptions can be an effective strategy to 
reduce pharmaceutical consumption. 
Thus, an increase in patients’ co-payment leads not only to the reduction of 
drugs consumption but also to the decrease in the price of drugs. Pharmaceutical 
producers, in they turn, react to the changes in patients’ co-payment. In Germany 
pharmaceutical producers significantly decreased their prices for drugs after 
changing patient co-payment (Pavcnik, 2002).  
When the reimbursement rate is high, the prices for branded drugs may 
increase, even after the entrance of cheap generics (Ferrara & Kong, 2008). 
Authors show in their theoretical model that consumers differ in their insurance 
coverage and that doctor take these differences into account when prescribing 
drugs. After patent expiration, when generic drugs become available, doctors 
                                                          
3
 The Defined Daily Dose (DDD) is a statistical measure of drug consumption, defined by the World Health 
Organization (WHO). It is used to standardize the comparison of drug usage between different drugs or 
between different health care environments. 
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continue to prescribe both branded drugs and generics for consumers with low co-
payment, but only generics for those with less coverage. 
Portela (2009) analyzed the effect of reimbursement level on consumption 
of generics in Portugal. Panel data set covers drugs, which contributed to the 
larger proportion of NHS expenditure in Portugal between January and September 
2003. By using OLS estimation method, the author finds that the reimbursement 
level is one of the determinants for generic consumption. Author gets a significant 
result after controlling for Reference Price System (RPS). This shows that when 
reimbursement level increases, the consumption of generics relatively to branded 
also increase. One may conclude that after implementation of the RPS there was 
no moral hazard effect in Portuguese pharmaceutical market. However, this data 
includes only drugs covered by reimbursement category C (reimbursement level is 
37%) and category B (reimbursement level is 69%), which are the two lower 
reimbursement categories. Results would probably change if drugs of category A 
were included.  
The insurance co-payment effect on the demand of generics was analyzed 
by Moreno-Torres (2011). The author uses panel data set of drugs monthly 
prescribed from 1999 to 2005. It distinguishes between three different levels of 
insurance, and includes the three most consumed therapeutic subgroups in Spain: 
statins (anticholesterol), selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (antidepressants) 
and proton pump inhibitors (antiulcers). Results confirm the existence of moral 
hazard effect in the regulated Spanish pharmaceutical market.  The greater the 
reimbursement level the patient has, the lower the proportion of generics 
prescriptions made by doctors. So, one of the factors which slows down the 
penetration of generics into the Spanish market is the low level of co-payment. 
The importance of price difference and level of national insurance for the 
probability of choosing generic drugs instead of more expensive original branded 
version was analyzed by (Dalen, Furu, Locatelli & Strom, 2011). The authors’ data 
set contains all prescriptions dispensed to patients in February 2004 and 2006 for 
23 different drugs in Norway. Once again authors confirm importance of both 
doctors’ and patients’ characteristics for the choice probabilities. The results show 
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that the larger the difference in price between branded and generic version, the 
more likely it is that the generics is purchased, in other words when the patient has 
to pay more, the probability of choosing generics increase. The patients covered 
by the national insurance scheme are more likely to use branded drugs. The time 
after generic entry is a very important issue. The probability of opting for generic 
prescription increases with time after generic entry. 
To sum up, the empirical evidence on moral hazard in pharmaceutical 
market is not decisive. Some authors find evidence supporting the existence of 
moral hazard effect (Lundin, 2000; Rudholm, 2005; Moreno-Torres, 2011; Dalen, 
Furu, Locatelli & Strom, 2011; etc.), other do not (Hellerstein, 1998; Portela, 2009). 
In appendix A, it is presented a table 1 that summarizes the literature 
review.   
 
2.2 Portuguese pharmaceutical market 
2.2.1 Reference Price System 
In Portugal, the pharmaceutical market is highly regulated. The Portuguese 
Regulatory Agency for Pharmaceuticals (INFARMED) is a government agency, 
which subordinates to the Health Ministry. Its objective is the protection of Public 
Health, by monitoring, assessing and regulating all activities related to drugs and 
health products. 
One of the purposes of the Health Ministry is to control pharmaceutical 
expenditure, which is large and increased from 2000 to 2009 in 1.9% per year in 
real terms (OECD, 2011). The government indirectly created incentives to reduce 
prices of drugs, which supposedly occurred on a voluntary basis, as the case of 
implementation of the RPS. The RPS in Portugal was introduced in 2002 (Decree-
Law No. 270/2002, December 2). The aim was to contain pharmaceutical 
expenditure by defining a fixed amount to be paid by the NHS, in this way assuring 
that the patient would have access to an alternative of quality and proven 
therapeutic equivalence.  
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The internal Reference Price4 (RP) is the average price of the five cheapest 
drugs, which exist in the market and are included in the same homogenous group 
(Decree-Law nº106-A/2010 of October 1). This homogeneous group (HG) includes 
drugs with the same active ingredients, pharmaceutical form, strength and route of 
administration and generics. The same homogeneous group could enclose several 
sizes of packages, which is denominated as the range size package.                         
The patient pays the difference between Pharmacy Retail Price (PRP) and 
Reimburse Price. Reimburse price5 is RP multiplied by the level of reimbursement. 
 
2.2.2 Reimbursement, prices and advertisement of drugs 
Reimbursement system differs between special regime6 and general 
regime. Special regime covers pensioners, whose total annual income does not 
exceed 14 times the minimum wage.  
There are four different reimbursement categories. For general regime there 
are: 
 Category A with reimbursement level of 90% (Decree-Law No. 106-A/2010 
of October 1);  
 Category B with reimbursement level of 69%; 
 Category C with reimbursement level of 37%; 
 Category D7 with reimbursement level of 15% (Decree-Law No. 48-A/2010 
of May 13). 
For special regime there are: 
 Category A – 95%; 
 Category B – 85%; 
 Category C - 52%; 
                                                          
4
 Before 2010, RP corresponded to the generics with the highest public retail price. So, it was closer to brand 
price. This reduced the incentives to use generics in the higher reimbursement rates. 
5
 Reimburse price is PRP multiplied by the level of reimbursement, if particular drug does not have RP. 
6
 Our data includes NHS drug sales and reimbursement expenditure for both General and Special regimes 
7
 Category D is not observable in the data, because it covers only new drugs, with transitory reimbursement 
system. 
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 Category D – 30% (Decree-Law No. 129/2005 of August 11).  
Reimbursement level for the beneficiaries of special regime is 95% for “all 
categories” if PRP of drugs is equal or less than RP (Decree-Law No.106-A/2010 
of October 1)8 . 
These reimbursement categories vary according to pharmaceutical groups 
and subgroups as in Appendix B Table 2 (appendix of Decree No. 924-A/2010 of 
September 17). To reduce the economic incentives in over consumption of some 
drugs, some groups and subgroups are included in the various reimbursement 
categories9. It differs according to the indications of the drug, its use, entities that 
prescribe and even the increased consumption for patients suffering from certain 
pathologies. 
Generic price of drugs must be 35% lower than those of similar branded or 
20% in case they cost less than 10 Euros (Decree-law No. 65/2007 of March 14). 
By the end of 2008 the maximum price of generics, above 5 Euros, was reduced 
to 30% of the branded drug price (Governmental Decree-law No. 1016 – A/2008 of 
September 8). The prices of new drugs for which there is HG must be the same or 
below than the RP of this HG (Governmental Decree No. 914/2003 of September 
1)10. Prices may be revised annually on rates fixed in a Governmental Decree 
published jointly by the Minister of the Economy and the Minister of Health, 
according to the inflation rate. At any time laboratories may apply for a price 
increase due to new therapeutic indications being discovered or to other changes 
in the product (pharmaceutical form) (Gouveia & Teixeira, 2002). It must be 
approved by INFARMED (Governmental Decree No. 1279/2001 of November 14). 
Advertisement of drugs in Portugal is highly regulated as well. It is 
prohibited to advertise to the public, the following drugs: 
 Prescribed by physicians; 
                                                          
8 
From 2005 to 2009 reimbursement level for category A was 95% for general regime and 100% for special 
regime for “all categories”. As it was found that reimbursement of 100% induced to the increase of 
consumption and abuse of special regime, implying a higher expenditure to the NHS, it was changed in 2010, 
by Decree-Law No. 106 A/2010, to 90% for general regime and 95% for special regime for “all categories”. 
9
 From our data set, the Antifungals, the Antivirals and the Non-Steroidal Anti-inflammatory Agents may be 
covered by category B and/or by category C. The Psychodrugs may be included in Categories A,B and C.  
10
 Barros & Nunes (2011) reviewed all changes in the legislation about prices and reimbursement system. 
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 Containing stupefacient and psychotropic substances, under international 
conventions binding the Portuguese State; 
 Reimbursed by National Health System (Decree-Law No. 176/2006 of 
August 30). 
Physicians have to inform the patient about the existence of generic drugs 
in the market, reimbursed by the NHS and about the drugs with the lowest prices 
(Decree-Law No. 271/2002 of December 2). 
 
2.2.3 Analyses of pharmaceutical market in Portugal 
There are several studies which analyze the pharmaceutical market in 
Portugal. Portela (2009) concludes that between 2000 and 2005 the RPS did not 
have much influence on public pharmaceutical expenditure.  
Vogler & Leopold (2009) advised the policy makers to continue improving 
policies to promote generics, accompanied by reduction of generics prices. They 
concluded that the INFARMED has good publication policies. However, in their 
opinion the patients do not fully understand the RPS. They suggest the civil 
society to act as “translators” between regulators and the general public.       
Similar conclusions can be found in Gonçalves (2009). The author analyzed 
20 countries of the European Union. Portugal is in 11th place in the generic drug 
market share in value. After questioning physicians, pharmacists and patients the 
author found that the patients pointed to the lack of information on generic drugs 
from the government or authorities of pharmaceutical industry; the lack of 
confidence in generic drugs by doctors and pharmacists. 
After survey to the Portuguese population, Cabral & Silva (2009) found that 
the number of patients who accepted prescriptions of generics increased from 
2001 to 2008. However, it is relevant to know if this increase occurs in the same 
way in different reimbursement categories. And they didn´t provide this analysis.  
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3. Hypothesis, Methodology and Data Set 
In this chapter we start from the definition of the hypotheses and then we 
explain our methodology. Finally we represent the data set used for the empirical 
work.  
3.1 Hypothesis 
The four hypotheses to be tested in this work are presented and explained 
next. 
Hypothesis 1: The doctors are better agents for the patient than for third 
party payer 
According to the literature review, some studies find existence of moral 
hazard effect in the pharmaceutical market. In the presence of this effect 
physicians are better agents for the patients than for third-party payer, meaning 
that they prescribe more expensive branded drugs to the patients with higher 
reimbursement level and for patients with higher co-payment more generics 
(assuming doctors respond to the patients’ demand).  
If there is moral hazard effect, then the higher reimbursement level has a 
negative effect on the relative market share of generics to branded drugs.  
We suggest another alternative to test the existence of moral hazard. This 
is the “relative expenditure between NHS and patients”. An increase in this 
variable may decrease the “relative market share between generics and branded 
drugs” then it may be deduced that there is evidence of moral hazard. 
 In order to identify the existence, or not, of moral hazard, the estimated 
coefficients of these variables, should be negative and statistically significant. 
 Hypothesis 2: The generics average price is negatively related with the 
relative market share of generics to branded drugs 
The generics price should be the more decisive factor in their consumption. 
So we can expect lower demand for generics in the pharmaceutical subgroups 
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with the higher average price. The estimated significant negative sign for this 
coefficient confirms this hypothesis. 
 Hypothesis 3: Generic market share depends positively on the life time of 
generics in the market 
 Generic producers require time to distribute their products through markets. 
Consumers need time to get acquainted with new drugs. Positive statistically 
significant sign of estimated coefficient confirms third hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 4: Consumption of generics increase with the higher price 
difference between branded drugs and generics 
 When the price of generics is much smaller than the price of branded drugs, 
patients are more likely to buy generic drugs. Statistically significant estimated 
positive sign for this coefficient confirms this hypothesis. 
 
3.2 Methodology 
3.2.1 Estimation method  
There are several studies that find evidence of moral hazard in 
pharmaceutical market. Usually authors use panel data (longitudinal data) 
(Moreno-Torres, 2011; Lundin, 2000).  
Econometrically we can present panel data in following way: 
itiitititit cXy   ,                                                                               [1]                      
 where are:  
 
ity  - the dependent variable;  
 
itX  - the independent variables; 
 
it - the overall intercept; 
 
it - the coefficients for independent variables; 
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 
ic  - the individual effect; 
 
it - the idiosyncratic error; 
 i - cross-section observations; 
 t - time series observations. 
According to econometric literature panel data can be estimated by Pooled 
OLS; Fixed effects approach (FE) or Random effects approach (RE); and by 
Method of Generalized Estimation Equation (GEE). 
 The Pooled OLS approach ignores the panel structure of the data and 
simply estimates 
it  and it by regressing ity on a constant and on itX . If ic  
is correlated with any element of
itX , then pooled OLS is biased and 
inconsistent. 
 In the FE approach, the individual-specific effect allowed to be correlated 
with the explanatory variables 0),( iit cXCov .  
 In the RE approach, the individual-specific effect uncorrelated with the 
explanatory variables 0),( iit cXCov .  
 The GEE was introduced by Liang & Zeger (1986). The focus of GEE is on 
estimating the average response over population – “population-averaged 
effect”. Given a mean model, 
it , and variance structure iV , the estimation 
equation is given by: 
  0)(,)()( 1
1



 

 


 UYVU ii
N
i k
it                                                            [2] 
We use overall F-test to choose between fixed effects approach and pooled 
OLS. The pooled OLS is the restricted model. Rejection of null hypothesis means 
that fixed effect is present (Wooldridge, 2002).  
For choosing between fixed effects and random effects estimation, it is used 
Sargan-Hansen test, because it extends straightforwardly to heteroskedasticity 
and cluster-robust versions, so it is guaranteed generate a nonnegative test 
statistic. The test is implemented by using the artificial regression approach 
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described by Arellano (1993) and Wooldridge (2002), in which a random effects 
equation is re-estimated and augmented with additional variables, consisting of the 
original regressors transformed into deviations from mean form.  The test statistic 
is a Wald test of the significance of these additional regressors. A large-sample 
chi-squared test statistic is reported with no degrees-of-freedom corrections.  
Ghisletta & Spini (2004) showed that GEE approach for longitudinal data 
can be applied, when the Random effects approach was chosen. Authors 
mentioned that the estimators of GEE are unbiased, even with possible 
misspecification of the longitudinal structure. For these reasons, we estimate the 
GEE approach and compare results with the random effects approach. 
 
3.2.2 Econometric model and variables  
The demand determinants usually considered in the literature are the 
following: price difference between two drug versions (Dalen, Furu, Locatelli & 
Strom, 2011), months since generics have been on the market (Moreno-Torres, 
2011), average prices of generics and branded drugs, presentations of generic 
drugs and reimbursement level as determinants for ratio between generics and 
branded drugs market share (Portela, 2009; Moreno-Torres, 2011).  
In our model, prices are calculated from the dataset by dividing values of 
sales in euros by quantities sold. Patient expenditure is calculated by subtraction 
NHS11 drug sales (Pharmacy Retail Price) by NHS reimbursement expenditure 
(Reimbursed price) per month by pharmaceutical subgroups. 
There are different ways to look for evidence of moral hazard. We use two 
approaches to capture this evidence. 
 The first approach is based on the correlation between reimbursement 
level and the relative market share of generics to branded drugs. 
                                                          
11
 NHS drug sales include only sales of reimbursed drugs, which are prescribed by physicians. 
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The second approach allows for the correlation between the ratio of NHS to 
patients expenditure for drugs and relative market share of generics to branded 
drugs.  
In both approaches a negative correlation reflects evidence of moral 
hazard.            
Two separate regressions are estimated to avoid multicollinearity that exists 
between the Reimbursement Level and the Ratio of NHS to patient expenditure for 
drugs. 
The econometric regression for the first approach can be presented in the 
following way: 
itiitititititit cgpresRLEgAPmAPgRgme it   _lnlnln 543210 ,   [3] 
where lnRgmeit means natural logarithm of relative market share between the 
generics and branded drugs. In other words it is natural logarithm of ratio between 
generics and branded drugs market shares in packages; i is the pharmaceutical 
subgroup and t is the month (more information presented in Appendix B Table 3). 
Independent variables are following: 
 lnAPgit - the natural logarithm of average generics price; 
 lnAPmit – the natural logarithm of average branded price;  
 Egit – the number of months, since the entry of the generic drugs; 
 pres_git - the number of generics presentations in the market; 
 RLit – the Reimbursement Level; it is the ratio between reimbursement 
expenditure of NHS and NHS drug sales; 
 cit  - the individual effect; 
 
it  – the error term. 
Econometric regression for the second approach is following: 
itiitititititit cgpresEgAPmAPgRgme it   _Relnlnln 543210 ,   [4] 
where Reit means the relative expenditure between NHS and patients. 
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We include the price difference between branded drugs and generics to test 
fourth hypothesis. This minimizes the possible multicollinearity between average 
prices of generics and branded drugs.  
The econometric equation for the first approach is: 
itiititititit cgpresRLEgPdRgme it   _lnln 43210 ,                         [5] 
For the second approach the econometric equation is: 
itiititititit cgpresEgPdRgme it   _Relnln 43210 ,                         [6] 
where lnPdit means natural logarithm of price difference between branded drugs 
and generics. 
 
3.3 Data Set and descriptive statistic 
We use dataset of monthly prescribed drug consumption from 2004 to 
2009, provided by INFARMED. Monthly Evolution of NHS Drug Sales by 
Pharmaceutical Subgroups in value and packages and Monthly Evolution of NHS 
Reimbursement Expenditure by Pharmaceutical Subgroups available in the official 
site of INFARMED in medicine statistic publications.  
Monthly Evolution of NHS Generics Drug Sales by Pharmaceuticals 
Subgroup in value and packages; Number of presentations of drugs by 
pharmaceutical subgroups provided by the Information Centre on Medicines and 
Health Products in INFARMED.  
Data captures the NHS market for the pharmaceutical subgroups for which 
generics exist in the period 2004 to 2009 in Portugal (Appendix B table 2).  
The panel dataset covers 38 pharmaceutical subgroups, for 72 months, in a 
total number of observations is 2736.    
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3.3.1 Descriptive statistic  
In table 4 in Appendix B, we present some descriptive statistics about prices, 
reimbursement level and relative market share between generics and branded 
drugs. It can be seen that the minimum average price of generics is 1.18 euros 
and the maximum is 78 euros. For the branded drugs 2.66 euros and 76 euros 
respectively. The maximum average price for generics is higher than for branded 
drugs because in some pharmaceuticals subgroups, branded drugs have more 
presentations than the generics counterpart. Since the generics presentations 
depend on the branded presentations, it may happen that generics presentations 
mimic the most expensive branded presentations. Thus, in average terms it is 
possible to find the maximum price of generics higher than the price of branded as 
shown next:    
,
__ 




k
k
n
n
bpres
Pb
gpres
Pg
if k > n                                                                   [7] 
where k – presentations of branded drugs; n- presentations of generic drugs; Pg – 
generics prices; Pb – branded prices; pres_g – generics presentations; pres_b – 
branded presentations. 
However, when considering the total sample, the mean value for generics 
average prices (15.9 euros) is 25% lower than branded average prices (19.4 
euros).  
The maximum value of relative market share between generics and branded 
drugs is 2.92 and the minimum is 0, since the entry of generics in the market 
happens in different times.  
Reimbursement level varies from 29% to 100%. In the beginning of 2004 the 
government reimbursed the total PRP of Anti-Parkinson Drugs.  
The number of months was counted from January 2004. In this way, the 
existence of generics varies from 1 to 72 months. The mean value is 32 months. 
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It can be seen that the mean value for the presentations of generics is 58. 
The maximum number of generics presentations is 830. This number corresponds 
to antihypertensive drugs (Category B).  
Figure 1 in Appendix B shows monthly evolution of related market share 
between generics and branded drugs by reimbursement categories. We divide 
subgroups according to three categories (A, B and C12). There are subgroups, 
however, which can belong to more than one reimbursement category and these 
are included in “Mix categories”13. Relative market share between generics and 
branded drugs in category A is much lower than for other categories. Relative 
expenditure between NHS and patients is much higher in category A (Figure 2 in 
Appendix B).   
From Figure 3 in Appendix B three different level of reimbursement can be 
observed. It is clear that the reimbursement level for category A is the highest one, 
followed by category B and in the third place category C. The subgroups that 
include Mix categories can be observed in the second level. Orange line of Anti-
acids and Anti-ulcerous subgroup (Category C) locates in second level of 
reimbursement (green color). This happens because in our data NHS 
reimbursement expenditure includes special regime of reimbursement, which can 
be 95% of reimbursement for all categories if PRP is lower or equal to RP.  
In tables 5 – 8 in Appendix B, we present the correlations between the 
variables considered in the econometric models. A moderate correlation is found 
between average generics price and average branded price. This is expected 
because they are both correlated by law in Portugal, which regulates 
pharmaceutical prices of reimbursed drugs.  
 
 
 
                                                          
12
 Government uses Category D for new drugs (for all pharmaceutical subgroups), with transitory 
reimbursement system. 
13
 “Mix categories” basically includes drugs from categories B and C. Only the psychodrugs can be included in 
categories A, B and C. However, the mean value of reimbursement level in this subgroup is 70%.   
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4. Empirical results 
Table 9 in Appendix C presents the results of the fixed effects estimations 
for the first and second approaches of testing the existence of moral hazard. We 
reject the random effects approach, since p-value of Sargan-Hansen test is highly 
significant. F-test shows joint significance for the fixed effects, meaning that 
individual-specific effect correlated with any explanatory variables and pooled OLS 
is biased and inconsistent. For the both approaches, the “R-Squared” tells us that 
74% of the variation in the variable “Market share ratio” was explained by 
variations in the independent variables (Knowledge Base, 2012). 
The estimated coefficients of the variables, which we use to capture moral 
hazard, are highly significant and have the expected sign. A 1% increase in the 
reimbursement level reduces the relative generics market share in 287% and a 1% 
increase in the ratio between NHS and patients expenditure reduces the market 
share ratio in 1%.  
Therefore, there is evidence of moral hazard. For those patients with greater 
reimbursement level the consumption of generics is lower than for patients with 
higher co-payment. In other words, when the government pays more, the 
consumption of expensive branded drugs increase. This result confirms the first 
hypothesis that physicians are better agents for the patients than for the NHS and 
they prescribe more expensive branded products to patients with higher levels of 
reimbursement. Thus it may be concluded that the low level of co-payment in 
Portugal has negatively affected the penetration of generics. This result is 
consistent with those of Moreno-Torres (2011), Dalen, Furu, Locatelli & Strom, 
2011), Rudholm (2005) and Lundin (2000). 
The estimated coefficient of the variable “Average Generics Price” is 
significant and it has the negative sign in the both regressions. A 1% increase in 
the generics price reduces the market share ratio between 1.59% and 1.68%. As 
expected, prices have a negative effect on the demand for generic drugs. 
Therefore, the second hypothesis is not rejected. In contrast, the estimated 
coefficient of the variable “Average branded price” is not significant at the 5% 
significance level in the presence of reimbursement level. For the second 
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approach of testing, this coefficient is significant and has negative sign. It means 
that with the increase of branded price, the consumption of these drugs increase. 
It is confirmed again the branded loyalty and the fact that the price can be a 
decisive factor in the consumption of generics.  
Concerning the third hypothesis, the estimated coefficients of the variable 
“Time on the market” are significant and have positive sign. A 1% increase in the 
number of months of existence of generics leads to the increase of the ratio 
between generics and branded drugs market share between 0.4% and 0.5%. In 
other words, the number of generics prescriptions increase as time passes after 
generics entry. It takes time to increase the consumption of new products in the 
market, since patients and doctors have to gain confidence in the new generic 
drugs. 
Finally, regarding the number of generics presentations, the estimation 
shows that a 1% increase of these presentations causes an increase on average 
and approximately of 0.1% in the relative market share between generics and 
branded drugs.  
We estimate the first and second econometric regressions for the market of 
Anti-hypertensive, and Anti-ulcer and Anti-acids drugs14. Results of these 
estimations are presented in Appendix C Table 10. Sargan-Hanset test shows that 
Pooled OLS estimation is appropriate in this case; meaning that effect of 
individuality is not present. For the both regressions, the “R-Squared” tells us that 
99% of the variation in the variable “Market share ratio” was explained by 
variations in the independent variables. Estimated results show that a 1% increase 
of generics price expands the generics market share with respect to branded 
drugs. Generics market share in this case increases for the patients with higher 
reimbursement level and with the number of months since generics entry to the 
market. There is no evidence of moral hazard in this case.  
 
                                                          
14
These 2 pharmaceutical subgroups belong to reimbursement categories B and C. They present the highest 
NHS reimbursement expenditure between drugs, which belong to these two reimbursement categories during 
the period 2004 to 2009 in Portugal.  
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 Table 11 in Appendix C shows the estimation of two regressions with 
respect to the fourth hypothesis. The random effects estimation cannot be 
rejected, since p-value of Sargan-Hansen test is 0.4319 and 0.3306 respectively. 
The p-value of Wald Chi-Square test is significant, which means that at least one 
of the regression coefficients in the model is not equal to zero. For the both 
approaches, the “R-Squared” tells us that 60% of the variation in the variable 
“Market share ratio” was explained by variations in the independent variables. The 
results from GLS random effects estimation and GEE population-average model 
are very similar. The coefficients of price difference are highly significant and have 
positive sign, as it was expected. A 1% increase in the price difference between 
branded drugs and generics causes an increase in the ratio between generics and 
branded drugs market share between 0.156% and 0.165%. This result is 
consistent with Dalen, Furu, Locatelli & Strom (2011) and it confirms the fourth 
hypothesis. In other words, the higher the price difference between branded drugs 
and generics, the more likely doctors are to choose generics. 
The estimated coefficient of the variable RL is not significant at the 5% 
significance level in the first approach. However, there is significant and negative 
effect of ratio between NHS and patients expenditure on the relative market share. 
A 1% increase in the variable Re causes a 0.8% decrease in the ratio between 
generics and branded drugs. This effect is lower than in the estimation of second 
regression. However, this result reinforces the first hypothesis and indicates 
existence of moral hazard. Even when information about price difference between 
branded drugs and generics is available, consumers choose branded drugs when 
the government pays a bigger part in the drugs cost.   
The estimated coefficients of the variable number of months are significant 
and positive. These results are consistent with those above. The time that generic 
drugs remain on the market is important because physicians acquire knowledge 
about therapeutic effect of generics. This result confirms once again the third 
hypothesis and is coherent with those of Moreno-Torres (2011) and Dalen, Furu, 
Locatelli & Strom (2011). 
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Eventually, the number of generics presentations has a positive and 
significant relation with the relative market share between generics and branded 
drugs. In this way, the choice between generics and branded drugs depend on the 
number of generics presentations in the market.    
Moreover, we estimate the third and fourth econometric models for the two 
pharmaceutical subgroups (“Anti-hypertensive drugs” and “Anti-ulcers and anti-
acids drugs”). Sargan-Hanset test shows that Pooled OLS estimation is 
appropriate in this case. In both regressions, the “R-Squared” tells us that 94% of 
the variation in the variable “Market share ratio” was explained by variations in the 
independent variables. The estimated result does not show evidence of moral 
hazard for these subgroups of drugs (Appendix C Table 12). With the increase of 
government spending consumers prefer generics. No evidence of moral hazard in 
the markets with reimbursement categories B and C is found.  
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5. Conclusion and discussion 
This work aimed to test the existence of moral hazard in doctors’ 
prescription behavior. To achieve this aim we used two approaches. The first one 
lies in the estimation of the correlation between the variable Reimbursement level 
and relative market share between generics and branded drugs as used by 
Portela (2009). The second approach consists in the estimation of the correlation 
between the “relative expenditure between NHS and Patients” and market share 
ratio. Data used for the econometric estimations come from INFARMED for the 
period 2004 - 2009.   
We found that the higher the reimbursement level (or part that the 
government pays), the lower the proportion of generic drugs prescribed by 
physicians. In other words, patients with greater insurance coverage consumed 
more branded drugs than patients with lower coverage. Thus, physicians are 
better agents for the patients than for the third-party payer. The results here are 
inconsistent with Hellerstein’s (1998); however, they are consistent with the results 
by Moreno-Torres (2011), Dalen, Furu, Locatelli & Strom (2011), Rudholm (2005) 
and Lundin (2000). 
The price of generics plays an important role in the choice of the version of 
drugs. For the pharmaceutical subgroups with higher price, the consumption of 
generics is lower. A higher branded price does not influence patients or doctors’ 
decisions, in some cases even increases the consumption of these drugs. This 
may be due to the experience with branded drugs, which doctors and patients 
gained during patent protection. In this way, it may be said that generics need time 
to gain confidence. This is the reason why the length of time generics have been 
in the market is so important for the demand.  
The higher the number of generics presentations in the market, the greater 
the number of generics prescriptions made by physicians. On the other hand, 
laboratories develop more generics presentations, where there is a higher 
demand. Thus, there is a sort of propagation effect when generics become more 
prescribed.  
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When we included the information about price difference between branded 
drugs and generics, the reimbursement level does not explain consumption of 
generics while the ratio of NHS expenditure to patients’ expenditure does. Thus, 
partial existence of moral hazard is found. That is to say, the information about 
price difference between branded drugs and generics influences patients to 
choose generics.  
Finally, we did not find the existence of moral hazard in the pharmaceutical 
market for Anti-hypertensive, and Anti-ulcer and Anti-acids drugs (Categories B 
and C). The evidence of moral hazard in patients treated with drugs within 
category A, seems stronger than in other patients. For policy purpose, we suggest 
a partial reduction of reimbursement level for category A. For instance, 90% of 
reimbursement level in category A, when PRP of chosen drug is equal or lower 
than RP and 85% for the drug with PRP higher than RP. This may not only 
contribute to the increase in demand for generic drugs, but also to reduce the 
prices of drugs. 
The main conclusion of this work is that the high level of reimbursement in 
Portugal has negatively affected the penetration of generics. Moreover, it hampers 
the effort made by the Portuguese government to reduce public expenditure on 
pharmaceuticals.   
This work is a contribution to the empirical studies on the evidence of moral 
hazard in medical prescription. Two approaches were used to achieve this aim. 
While the first one (using RL) had been used before, the second approach was 
proposed by us (using Re). Results show that both approaches are consistent and 
both show evidence that moral hazard exists.   
Our work has relevance for the cost-containment policies in pharmaceutical 
expenditure. The rational use of generics may contribute to considerable savings. 
It can be achieved without compromising the quality of medical care and without 
significant reductions in co-payments of patients, which leads to welfare 
improvement. 
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The limitation of this analysis is the lack of information about generics 
consumption by the beneficiaries of special regime per month15. This information 
could supplement our understanding of generics consumption among different 
reimbursement levels. This is an issue that may be addressed in future research. 
Another limitation is that the data is aggregated for the pharmaceutical 
subgroups, whereas some drugs have different active ingredients and producers. 
However, it is difficult to control this heterogeneity.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
15
 Data covers NHS drug sales, which include both the special and the general regimes. However, there is no 
available information about the exact quantity sold per month for the special regime. 
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7. Appendices   
Appendix A 
Table 1: Brief summary of literature review 
Authors Title Year, 
Country 
Data Set Estimation 
Method 
Variables Results 
Judith 
Hellerstein 
“The importance of 
the physician in the 
generic versus 
trade-name 
rescription decision” 
USA, 
1998 
Data from 1989 National 
Ambulatory Medical Care survey 
(NAMCS).  
Datasets consists of patients 
visits to based physicians. 
Physicians selected in the 
survey recorded information of 
patients that visited their offices 
over a two-week period. Total 
number of observation: 8,579. 
Random-
effects probit 
model. 
Dependent:  is 1 when the generic version 
is prescribed, zero otherwise. 
Independent: Set of dummies: Age, Gender, 
White or non-white, Self-pay, Insurance 
companies, HMO plan, Specialist, Regions.  
Results: Physicians are an 
important agent in determining 
whether patients receive brand 
name or generic drugs. Very 
little can be explained by 
observable characteristics of 
individual patients. 
Andrea 
Coscelli  
“The importance of 
Doctors’ and 
Patients’ 
Preferences in the 
Prescription 
Decision” 
Italy, 
2000 
Dataset provided by “Istituto 
Superiore della Sanita”.   
Panel detailed dataset contains 
all the prescriptions in the anti-
ulcer drug market during period 
1990-1992.  Total number of 
observations is 75,000. 
Fixed effects 
Probit and 
Random 
effects Probit 
Dependent: is 1 if the brand prescribed is 
different from the brand previously 
prescribed, zero otherwise. 
Independent: Age; Gender; Total number of 
prescriptions; Total number of doctors; Total 
number of molecule, consumed by patient; 
Month; Quantity, prescribed by doctor; 
Herfindahl index across brand; Herfindahl 
index across molecule; Percentage of Old 
brand; Share of molecules; Dummies if 
physicians temporary, permanent for patient 
and if patient returns to previous physician. 
 
Results:  habits and tastes are 
very important for both: 
doctors and patients. Women 
prescribe more frequently new 
brand name drugs, older 
people are switched to new 
brand more than young. 
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 (Table 1 cont’d) 
Arleen 
Leibowitz, 
Willard G. 
Manning, 
Joseph P. 
Newhouse 
 
 
“The demand for 
prescription drugs as 
a function of cost-
sharing” 
1985. 
USA 
The data for this analysis are 
derived from the Rand Health 
Insurance Experiment. HIE 
Panel data include the 
expenditure, health, 
demographic characteristic of 
enrollees for three or five year 
period.  
Two equation 
model. Probit. 
Negative 
binominal 
regression. 
ANOVA, 
ANOCOVA 
Dependent: insurance plan, site, and 
demographic measures.  
Independent: Dummies: Insurance plan, 
Regions, Child, Gender, Per capita 
expenditure, the number of prescription 
drugs per capita, the percentage of drugs 
purchased through physicians and the 
percentage of generic drugs purchased at 
pharmacies.   
Results: Total expenditure on 
prescription pharmaceuticals is 
greater for patients with higher 
insurance coverage. The 
patients, who paid nothing, 
used 60 percent more services 
than those required to pay 
price - but the effect on the 
health of the average person 
was negligible 
Edward 
Coulson, 
Joseph Terza, 
Cheryl 
Neslusan, and 
Bruce Stuart 
“Estimating the 
Moral-Hazard Effect 
of Supplemental 
Medical Insurance in 
the Demand for 
Prescription Drugs 
by the Elderly” 
USA. 
1995 
Funding for survey design and 
implementation used in this 
research was supported by 
grants from the Pew Charitable 
Trusts and the Health Care 
Financing Administration. 
Data from a mail survey of 
health insurance and medicine 
use completed by 4,509 elderly 
Pennsylvania Medicare 
beneficiaries in the summer of 
1990. 
First and 
second 
stages 
multinomial 
logit 
Dependent: Number of prescription 
Independent: Number of current health 
problem, Set of dummies: Age, Gender, 
White or non-white, Marital status, Income, 
Education, Health, Insurance coverage, 
Smoker or not. 
Results: Patients with medical 
insurance use more drugs, 
prescribed by doctors than 
those without insurance. 
Edward 
Coulson, 
Bruce Stuart 
“Insurance Choice 
and the Demand for 
Prescription Drugs” 
USA. 
1995 
Data base from a survey of 
Health insurance and medicine 
use in the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania, conducted during 
the summer of 1990. 
Panel dataset constructed from 
survey responses and Medicare 
claims records for 4,066 elderly 
Pennsylvanians. 
OLS 
Probit 
 
Dependent: Prescriptions filled in previous 2 
weeks, persons with any prescriptions, 
prescriptions per user. For Probit: 1= report 
use of prescription drugs; 0 = report no drug 
use. 
Independent:  Number of current health 
problem, Set of dummies: Age, Gender, 
White or non-white, Marital status, Income, 
Education, Health status and Health habits, 
Insurance coverage. 
Results: Elder peoples use 
less prescription than people, 
who covered by PACE, 
Medicare. This is result of the 
price subsidy that PACE 
program beneficiaries enjoy 
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(Table 1 cont’d) 
Douglas 
Lundin  
“Moral hazard in 
physician 
prescription 
behavior” 
Stockholm, 
Sweden. 
2000. 
Department of Public Health and 
Caring Sciences, Primary Care 
Research at Uppsala University.  
Panel Data: all dispensed drugs 
by particular physician to patient, 
from two pharmacies in a small 
Swedish municipality. Period: 
1992-1993. Total number of 
observations: 6,142. 
Random-
effects probit 
model and 
simple probit. 
Dependent:  is 1 when the generic version 
is prescribed, zero otherwise. 
Independent: Cost difference 1992; Cost 
difference 1993. Dummies: trade-name 
prescribed last time; generic prescribed last 
time; 1993, active ingredient.    
 
Results: Physicians’ habits 
and the tastes acquired by 
patients are both important. 
Patients having to pay more 
are less likely to have brand-
name versions prescribed than 
patients getting most of their 
costs reimbursed. This 
indicates moral hazard. 
Niklas 
Rudholm  
“Pharmaceutical 
insurance and the 
demand for 
prescription 
pharmaceuticals in 
Vasterbotten 
Sweden” 
Sweden. 
2005 
Data provided by the local 
county council. It covering all 
prescription pharmaceuticals 
sold in the county of 
Vasterbotten, Sweden during 
2001. Total number of 
observations:  1,977,666 
OLS and the 
instrumental 
variable 
method 
Dependent: Price and DDD. 
Independent: Price per DDD, DDD. 
Dummies: Age, Private clinic, 
Recommended list, Level of copayment, 
Gender, District,  
Results: show that both, the 
quantities sold and the price of 
the drugs consumed, increase 
when the pharmaceutical 
insurance system pays part of 
the total cost of the 
pharmaceuticals consumed. 
Nina Pavcnik “Do pharmaceutical 
prices respond to 
potential patient out-
of-pocket 
expenses?” 
Germany. 
2002 
 
Data from IMS Health,  
Datastream International 
Database  Product level panel 
dataset covering several 
therapeutic categories before 
and after the policy change. 
Period from 1986-1996. 
Robust 
Standard 
Error 
Estimate for 
Cluster 
Sampling 
Data 
Dependent: Price of Average Daily Dose 
Independent: Share of Brands, Number of 
Generics per Active Ingredient,  Herfindahl 
index 
Results: In Germany 
pharmaceutical producers 
significantly changed prices for 
drugs after changing in patient 
copayment. 
Ida Ferrara, 
Ying Kong 
“Can health 
insurance coverage 
explain the generic 
competition 
paradox?” 
2008. 
Canada 
Theoretical three-stage model with consumers differing in their health insurance coverage Paper shows that there are 
conditions under which the 
price of brand-name drugs 
increases following the entry of 
generic drugs. 
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(Table 1 cont’d) 
Ivan Moreno-
Torres 
“Generic drugs in 
Spain: price 
competition vs. 
moral hazard” 
Spain. 
2011 
Directorate-General of 
Pharmacy and Health Products 
of the Spanish Ministry of 
Health and Consumer Affairs. 
Data from the Nomenclator 
Digitalis of the NHS Health.  
Base de Datos del 
ConocimientoSanitario 2005 - 
BOT PLUS. Panel data set of 
drugs monthly prescription 
from 1999 to 2005. Total 
number of observation: 23,584.  
Generalized two-
stage least squares 
random effects and 
the two-stage 
generalized method 
of moments 
estimations. 
Dependent: log of generic drug’s 
market share divided by the brand-
names’ market share. 
Independent: Within-generic share;  log 
of generic price per DDD;  log of 
average brand-name price per DDD; 
Time on the market;  Presentations; 
Number of indications; DDDs per 
tablet; Units; Dummies: No copayment, 
Small copayment; RPS1;RPS2; 1st 
generic entrant; 2nd generic entrant; 
3rd generic entrant; 4th generic 
entrant; 5th generic entrant. 
Results: The greater the level 
of insurance, that the patient 
has - the lower the proportion 
of generic prescriptions made 
by doctors. 
Maria Portela “Reimbursement 
regimes of 
government in the 
drugs price – 
assessment of 
Reference Price 
System´s impact in 
Portugal” 
Portugal. 
2005 
The Portuguese Regulatory 
Agency for Pharmaceuticals 
(INFARMED)  
Panel Data: of 15 homogenous 
groups (HG) of drugs analyzed 
during 72 month. From 2000 to 
2005. Total number of 
observations is 1,080. 
OLS estimation.  Dependent:  log of generic drug’s 
market share divided by the brand-
names’ market share and same 
variable *Dummy RPS. 
Independent: average price of HG; 
average price of brand name drugs; 
presentations of generics and brand 
name drugs; reimbursement level. 
Results: With the presence of 
Reference Price System 
consumption of generics 
increase. Increase of prices 
and reimbursement level leads 
to higher consumption of 
generics relatively to brand 
name drugs when RPS is 
considered.  
Dag Morten 
Dalen;  Kari 
Furu; Marilena 
Locatelli; 
Steinar Strøm 
“Generic 
substitution: micro 
evidence from 
register data in 
Norway.” 
Norway. 
2011 
Norwegian Prescription 
Database (NorPD) at the 
Norwegian Institute of Public 
Health. Dataset contains all 
prescriptions dispensed to 
patients in February 2004 and 
2006 on 23 different drugs 
(chemical substances). Total 
number of observations: 
313,078.  
Mixed logit 
maximum likelihood 
procedure 
Dependent: is 1 when the brand name 
is chosen, zero otherwise. 
Independent: Price difference, Number 
of DDD; Dummies: Age, General 
practitioner, Chains, Drug reimbursed 
by government; New generics; Index 
price regime in 2004.   
Results: The larger the 
difference in price between 
brand and generic version, 
patient buys more generics. 
When drugs reimbursed – 
more brand drugs is 
purchased. Younger doctors 
prescribe more generics. The 
probability of generic 
prescription increases with 
time after generic entry.  
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Appendix B 
Table 2:  Pharmaceutical subgroups, divided by reimbursement categories 
Category A 
(General regime 
90%, Special 
regime 95%) 
Category B (General 
regime 69%, Special 
regime 84%) 
Category C (General 
regime 37%, Special 
regime 52%) 
Category D 
(General regime 
15%, Special 
regime 30%) 
Psychodrugs Anti-hypertensives Antiacids and Anti-
ulcerous 
 
Anti-Parkinson Drugs Antibacterial Drugs Antilipemics New Drugs: 
Insulin, Oral Anti- 
diabetics and 
Glucagon 
Anticoagulants and 
antithrombotic 
Non-Steroidal Anti-
inflammatory Agents 
with transitory 
reimbursement 
system 
Antiepileptic and 
Anticonvulsants 
Antiarrhythmic Antihistamines  
Hormone and 
Hormone 
Antagonists 
Antiasthmatic and 
Bronchodilators 
Antivirals  
Hypothalamus and 
Pituitary Hormones, 
Analogues and 
Antagonists 
Sex Hormones Nasal Preparations    
Immunomodulators Antigout Agents Vasodilators  
Treatment of 
Glaucoma Agents 
Drug acting on bone 
and Calcium 
Metabolism 
Stupefacient´s Analgesics   
 Drugs used in 
Arthrosis 
Antifungals   
 Psychodrugs Drugs for Acne and 
Rosacea Treatment 
 
 Antifungals Drugs Altering Gut Motility  
 Antivirals Enzymatic Supplements, 
Lactic Bacillus and 
Analogues 
 
 Non-Steroidal Anti-
inflammatory Agents 
Cough Suppressants and 
Expectorants 
 
  Analgesics and 
antipyretics  
 
  Topical Anti-infective  
  Antiemetic and 
Anteverting Drugs 
 
  Other Central Nervous 
System Drugs 
 
  Psychodrugs  
  Corticosteroids  
  Muscle Relaxants  
  Other Genital Disorders 
agents 
 
  Antimigraine Agents  
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Table 3: Description of variables 
Variable Definition  
Market share ratio (Rgme) Generics market share divided by the branded 
drugs market share (Monthly prescription NHS 
drug consumption generics and branded by 
pharmaceutical subgroups, unit: EUR ) 
Average generics price (APg) Average price per pharmaceutical subgroup of 
the generic drug, unit: EUR (Value of sale in 
euro/quantities sold) 
Average brand price (APm) Average price per pharmaceutical subgroup of 
the branded drugs, unit: EUR (Value of sale in 
euro/quantities sold) 
Price difference (Pd) Average branded price – average generics 
price, unit: EUR  
Number of generics presentations (pres_g) Monthly evolution of number of generics 
presentations by pharmaceuticals subgroups in 
the market 
Time on the market (Eg) Number of months since generics entry to the 
market. We count number of months from the 
January 2004.  
Reimbursement level (RL) Ratio between reimbursement expenditure of 
NHS (Reimbursed price) and NHS drug sales 
(Pharmacy Retail Price) per month by 
pharmaceutical subgroups. NHS 
reimbursement expenditure includes special 
and general regime. 
Patient Copayment (CP) Ratio between Patient expenditure (Patients’ 
price) and NHS drug sales (Pharmacy Retail 
Price) per month by pharmaceutical 
subgroups. 
Relative expenditure (Re) Ratio between NHS reimbursement 
expenditure and patients copayment (Monthly 
evolution of NHS and patients expenditure on 
pharmaceuticals by pharmaceutical subgroups, 
unit: EUR ) 
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Table 4: Summary statistic 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Market share ratio (Rgme) 2736 0.1969661 0.258513 0 2.929419 
Average generics price 
(APg) 
2736 15.91635 16.07166 1.186615 78.93597 
Average brand price (APm) 2736 19.4314 13.81646 2.662459 76.52427 
Number of generics 
presentations (pres_g) 
2736 57.6239 124.9876 0 830 
Time on the market (Eg) 2736 32.67434 22.01556 1 72 
Reimbursement level (RL) 2736 0.6175776 0.1965107 0.2884557 1 
Patient Copayment (CP) 2736 0.3824224 0.1965107 0 0.7115443 
Relative expenditure (Re) 2736 5.276639 11.31048 0 122.8478 
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Figure 1: Monthly evolution of related market share between generics and branded 
drugs by reimbursement categories 
 
Figure 2: Monthly evolution of related expenditure between NHS and Patients by 
Reimbursement Categories
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Figure 3: Monthly evolution of reimbursement level by Categories 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
R
e
im
b
u
rs
e
m
e
n
t 
L
e
v
e
l
01jan2004 01jan2006 01jan2008 01jan2010
Period of time between Jan.2004 and Jan.2010
Reimbursement Level Cat.A Reimbursement Level Cat.B
Reimbursement Level Cat.C Reimbursement Level Mix Cat
53 
 
Table 5: Correlation and covariance matrix between variables in the first 
econometric regression 
 lnRgme lnAP_g lnAP_m Qesns Eg pres_g 
lnRgme 1.0000      
lnAP_g 0.0397 1.0000     
lnAP_m 0.2585 0.6289 1.0000    
RL 0.1421 0.1960 0.3665 1.0000   
Eg 0.0265 0.2535 -0.0004 -0.0142 1.0000  
pres_g 0.2233 0.2201 0.1103 0.1291 0.2455 1.0000 
 
Table 6: Correlation and covariance matrix between variables in the second 
econometric regression 
 lnRgme lnAP_g lnAP_m Re Eg pres_g 
lnRgme 1.0000      
lnAP_g 0.0397 1.0000     
lnAP_m 0.2585 0.6289 1.0000    
Re 0.0058 0.0786 0.1724 1.0000   
Eg 0.0265 0.2535 -0.0004 -0.0519 1.0000  
pres_g 0.2233 0.2201 0.1103 -0.0715 0.2455 1.0000 
 
Table 7: Correlation and covariance matrix between variables in the third 
econometric regression 
 lnRgme lnPd Qesns Eg pres_g 
lnRgme 1.0000     
lnPd 0.1244 1.0000    
RL 0.1421 0.0404 1.0000   
Eg 0.0265 -0.0758 -0.0142 1.0000  
pres_g 0.2233 -0.2267 0.1291 0.2455 1.0000 
 
Table 8: Correlation and covariance matrix between variables in the fourth 
econometric regression 
 lnRgme lnPd Re Eg pres_g 
lnRgme 1.0000     
lnPd 0.1244 1.0000    
Re 0.0058 0.0268 1.0000   
Eg 0.0265 -0.0758 -0.0519 1.0000  
pres_g 0.2233 -0.2267 -0.0715 0.2455 1.0000 
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Appendix C 
Table 9: Results from the Fixed Effects estimation of the first and second 
econometric regression 
lnRgme Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t| 
lnAP_g -1.678743 0.000 -1.58749 0.000 
lnAP_m -0.2095229 0.078 -.2949521 0.014 
RL -2.866122 0.000 - - 
Re - - -0.0102756 0.000 
Eg 0.0039466 0.000 0.0053301 0.000 
pres_g 0.0010549 0.000 0.0009538 0.000 
cons 2.414414 0.000 0.6723849 0.000 
sigma_u 1.4210473  1.1620394  
sigma_e 0.45076008  0.45316304  
rho 0.90858081  0.86799656  
F test that all 
u_i=0: 
F(37, 2693) =   
169.12 
Prob > F = 
0.0000 
F(37, 2693) =   
166.50 
Prob > F = 
0.0000 
Sargan-Hansen 
statistic 
145.835  Chi-
sq(5) 
P-value = 0.0000 101.387  Chi-
sq(5) 
P-value = 0.0000 
R-squared 0.7434  0.7406  
Adj. R-squared 0.7394  0.7366  
Overall F test F(5,2693) = 
367.94 
Prob > F  = 
0.0000 
F(5,2693)  = 
358.35 
Prob > F   = 
0.0000 
Number of 
observations 
2736  2736  
 
Table 10: Results from the Pooled OLS estimation of the first and second 
econometric regression for “Anti-hypertensive”, “Anti-ulcers and Anti-acids” 
subgroups   
lnRgme Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t| 
lnAP_g 0.4175715     0.000 0.426584 0.000 
lnAP_m   1.566213    0.000 1.52242 0.000 
RL  1.672822    0.000 - - 
Re - - 0.087525 0.000 
Eg  0.012456    0.000 0.0124684 0.000 
pres_g     -0.000208    0.000 -0.0002293 0.000 
cons    -4.980941    0.000      -3.935011 0.000      
Sargan-Hansen 
statistic  
Equivalent to 
pooled OLS 
 Equivalent to 
pooled OLS 
 
R-squared   0.9936  0.9938  
Adj. R-squared  0.9933  0.9935  
F(5,138) 
Prob > F 
4255.77 
0.0000 
 F(5,138) 
Prob > F 
4399.15                          
0.0000 
Number of 
observations            
144  144  
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Table 11: Results from the Random Effects GLS and GEE estimations of the third 
and fourth econometric regressions 
 
lnRgme 
Random effects GLS regression GEE population-average model 
RL Re RL Re 
 Coef. P>|z| Coef. P>|z| Coef. P>|z| Coef. P>|z| 
lnPd 0.156020 0.000 0.1647191        0.000      0.1559907 0.000 0.1647097 0.000      
RL 0.287610 0.348 - - 0.2896544 0.342 - - 
Re - - -0.007490      0.000     - - -0.007486    0.000     
Eg 0.0028274 0.000 0.00248    0.000      0.002826 0.000 0.0024792     0.000      
pres_g 0.0013276 0.000 0.00128    0.000      0.0013287 0.000 0.0012805    0.000      
cons -1.573897 0.000 -1.35298       0.000     -1.575146 0.000 -1.352986    0.000     
R-squared 0.6010  0.6041      
Adj.R-
squared  
0.5949  0.5981      
Wald chi2(4) 
Prob > chi2 
225.61 
0.0000 
 246.62 
0.0000 
 226.03 
0.0000 
 247.05 
0.0000 
 
Number of 
observations 
2736  2736  2736  2736  
Sargan-
Hansen 
statistic 
3.813 Chi-
sq(4) 
P>Chi-
sq(4) 
0.4319 
4.602  Chi-
sq(4) 
P>Chi-
sq(4)  
0.3306 
    
 
Table 12: Results from the Pooled OLS estimation of the third and fourth 
econometric regression for “Anti-hypertensive”, “Anti-ulcers and Anti-acids” 
subgroups   
lnRgme Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t| 
lnPd -0.0971197 0.000 -0.0958493 0.000 
Rl 2.140514 0.000 - - 
Re - - 0.124959 0.000 
Eg  .0199195 0.000 0.0198863 0.000 
pres_g     -.0013648 0.000 -0.0013569 0.000 
constant    -2.316313 0.000 -1.093948 0.000 
Sargan-Hansen 
statistic  
Equivalent to 
pooled OLS 
 Equivalent to 
pooled OLS 
 
R-squared   0.9365  0.9393  
Adj. R-squared  0.9347  0.9375  
F(4,139) 
Prob > F 
512.38 
0.0000 
 F(4,139) 
Prob > F 
537.40 
0.0000 
Number of 
observations           
144  144  
 
